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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF CHRONIC ALCOHOLICS
A 1965 report estimates that there are 700,000 alcoholics in New York State.1
Over sixty percent of the inmates of the Monroe County, New York, Peniten-
tiary are alcohol offenders.2 In 1963, Portland, Oregon, listed 11,000 alcohol-
related crimes by 2,000 persons. 3 These statistics illustrate the scope of the
problem of alcoholism in the United States, where it is ranked fourth among
major health problems, behind cancer, heart disease, and mental illness.4 Despite
the fact that the members of the medical profession unanimously recognize
alcoholism as a disease requiring clinical therapy and rehabilitation,5 until
recently the law has treated the alcoholic as a criminal whenever he displays his
disease in public.6
Recent Developments-A Change in Judicial Attitude?
A recent case in the District of Columbia, Easter v. District of Columbia,7
held that chronic alcoholism is a defense to the criminal charge of public intoxi-
cation. 8 It follows two other recent federal decisions9 suggesting that a judicial
trend reflecting modern medical and psychiatric knowledge may be developing.
DeWitt Easter had been arrested seventy times since 1937 for alcohol-related
offenses, twelve times in 1963 alone.10 In the present prosecution, Easter claimed
that, as a chronic alcoholic, he could not be convicted of public intoxication,"1
since he would, in effect, be punished for displaying symptoms of an illness. The
trial and intermediate appellate courts refused to accept this argument.' 2 The
court of appeals unanimously reversed the decision of the lower courts. 13
The court of appeals relied first on an interpretation of two sections of the
District of Columbia Code,14 which indicates that individuals who have lost the
1 Report of the Task Force on Addictions, N.Y. State Planning Committee on Mental
Disorders 11 (1965).
2 Ibid.
3 Pittman, "The Chronic Drunkenness Offender: An Overview," Conference on the Court
and the Chronic Inebriate 6 (1965).
4 Celebrezze, "Opening Remarks," HEW National Conference on Alcoholism at iii (1963),
cited in Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
5 See Guttmacher & Weihofen, Psychiatry and the Law 318-22 (1952); Jellinek, The
Disease Concept of Alcoholism 41-44 (1960); Pittman & Gordon, Revolving Door, A Study
of the Chronic Police Case Inebriate 141 (1958); Keller, "Definition of Alcoholism," 21
Quart. J. Stud. Alcoholism 125 (1960); Moore, "Legal Responsibility and Chronic Alco-
holism," 122 Am. J. Psych. 748 (1966).
6 See, e.g., NJ. Stat. Ann. § 2A:170-30 (193); N.Y. Pen. Law § 1221 (McKinney Supp.
1966) which provides for the arrest and disposition of any person intoxicated in a public
place. The courts are given discretion to release the offender, commit him to the board of
inebriety, or impose fines and/or up to six months imprisonment for a first offense. Recidivist
offenders may incur penalties up to three years in the penitentiary.
7 Easter v. District of Columbia, supra note 4.
8 "No ... Person shall be drunk or intoxicated in any street, alley, park . . 2. D.C. Code
Ann. § 25-128(a) (1961).
9 Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966) ; Sweeney v. United States, 353 F.2d 10
(7th Cir. 1965).
Driver has been extensively noted; see, e.g., Notes, 1966 Duke L.J. 545, 54 Geo. L.J. 1422
(1966), 44 N.C.L. Rev. 818 (1966), 18 S.C.L. Rev. 504 (1966); 3 Tulsa LJ. 175 (1966),
7 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 394 (1966).
10 Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
11 See note 8 supra.
12 Easter v. District of Columbia, 209 A.2d 625 (D.C. Ct. App. 1965).
13 Easter v. District of Columbia, supra note 10. Four judges concurred in two separate
opinions.
'4 D.C. Code Ann. §§ 24-501 to 24-502 (1961).
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power of self-control over the use of alcoholic beverages should be treated as
sick persons rather than as criminals. 15 Therefore, a chronic alcoholic cannot be
punished for his drunkenness since he lacks "the ability to avoid the conduct
specified in the definition of the crime"'16 which is "an essential element of
criminal responsibility . . .,,1
The case is perhaps more significant because of the court's second and, by
its own statement,18 independent basis for the decision-that the punishment of
chronic alcoholics for public intoxication constitutes cruel and unusual punish-
ment in violation of the eighth amendment.' 9 This holding rests squarely on the
authority and rationale of the recent Fourth Circuit opinion in Driver v.
Hinnant,20 where the court reversed the district court's denial of the defendant's
habeas corpus petition.21 The North Carolina Supreme Court had previously
upheld Driver's conviction for public intoxication,22 despite his chronic alcohol-
ism. 23 The reversal was based on an extension of a United States Supreme Court
ruling in Robinson v. California24 that punishment of the "status" of dope
addiction 25 violated the eighth amendment. Drug addiction was found to be a
disease comparable to mental illness, leprosy., or venereal disease, any punish-
ment of which would "be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment .... ,,26
Driver is somewhat different from Robinson since the North Carolina statute
involved in Driver punished the act of public intoxication rather than the status
of chronic alcoholism. The court found this act to be a "symptom" of the
status of chronic alcoholism over which the defendant had no control and thus
Robinson was deemed controlling. Punishing the involuntary symptoms of the
status of chronic alcoholism was equally cruel and unusual.2 7 Not all courts
15 "The purpose ... is ...to substitute for jail sentences for drunkenness medical and
other scientific methods of treatment which will benefit the individual involved and more
fully protect the public." D.C. Code Ann. § 24-501 (1961). For purposes of the statute, the
alcoholic is defined as one who "chronically and habitually uses alcoholic beverages to the
extent that he has lost the power of self-control with respect to the use of such bever-
ages .... " D.C. Code Ann. § 24-502 (1961).
16 Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
17 Ibid. The court cited the Supreme Court's holding in Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246 (1952) that even though a statute did not expressly require a "voluntary" commis-
sion of the prohibited act, the presence of "intent" may nevertheless be required for
conviction.
18 Easter v. District of Columbia, supra note 16, at 52 n.6.
19 Id. at 54.
20 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
21 Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966), reversing 243 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C.
1965).
22 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-335 (1953 & Supp. 1965).
23 State v. Driver, 262 N.C. 92, 136 S.E.2d 208 (1964).
24 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
25 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11721 (West 1964).
20 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
27 Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 1966). The Supreme Court did not
extend its decision in Robinson to include "symptoms" since the offense in that case did not
require it. Robinson v. California, supra note 26, at 666. The opinion indicated that such
offenses as sale or possession of narcotics might be punished. Id. at 664.
This extention of the Robinson theory was first suggested in Sweeney v. United States, 353
F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1965), when petitioner's probation was revoked because he violated the
condition that he remain sober. Since the record indicated that the district court knew of
Sweeney's chronic alcoholism, the court of appeals indicated that "the probation condition...
would be unreasonable [citing Robinson] as impossible if psychiatric or other expert testi-
mony was to establish that petitioner's alcoholism has destroyed his power of volition and
prevented his compliance with the condition." Id. at 11.
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are prepared to accept the rationale adopted by Driver and followed in Easter.
For example, a recent Michigan decision, People v. Hoy, 28 reached the opposite
conclusion, upholding a conviction for public intoxication 9 despite a defense
that the accused was a chronic alcoholic.30
The Supreme Court recently refused to resolve the differences in this area
when it denied certiorari in Budd v. California.31 Mr. Justice Fortas dis:-
sented, arguing: "The use of the crude and formidable weapon of criminal
punishment of the alcoholic is neither seemly nor sensible, neither purposeful
nor civilized. ' 32 Mr. Justice Douglas agreed, citing Robinson as probably con-
trolling 33
Traditionally the eighth amendment protection against cruel and unusual
punishment applied only to the post-conviction treatment of -a criminal.34 The
Supreme Court held sentences whose severity was disproportionate to the seri-
ousness of the crime3 5 and sentences which, by their very nature, affr6nt the
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"3 6
to be cruel and unusual. Other federal courts applied the cruel and unusual
punishment clause to the treatment-of convicts by prison authorities. 37 Robinson
v. California is a significant expansion of the concept of cruel and unusual.
There, for the first time, the Supreme Court used the eighth amendment to
strike down the imposition of criminal liability per se. Noting that the punish-
ment awarded, ninety days imprisonment, was not cruel and unusual in the
abstract, the Court nevertheless said: "Even one day in prison would be a cruel
and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold."3 8 When no
"crime" has been committed, any punishment, however slight, is necessarily
cruel and unusual. While the ultimate significance of this aspect of Robinson
is still speculative,3 9 Easter and Driver testify to the fact that the eighth amend-
ment has become a substantial new weapon in the arsenal of criminal law reform.
28 3 Mich. App. 666, 143 N.W.2d 577 (1966).
29 Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.364 (1962) provides that anyone intoxicated in a public place is
a disorderly person whom § 28365 makes a misdemeanant.
30 People v. Hoy, 3 Mich. App. 666, 143 N.W.2d 577 (1966). The Michigan court held that
the offense was a violation of a police regulation (malum prohibitum) and therefore the issue
of voluntariness was not present. While acknowledging the decisions in Easter and Driver,
the court refused to follow them because they were not convinced that Hoy was an alcoholic
and because they were not prepared to say that punishment of chronic alcoholics is cruel and
unusual. Hoy's counsel has taken the necessary preliminary steps for appeal to the Michigan
Supreme Court. Letter from W. Charles Kingsley, Attorney at Law, to the Cornell Law
Quarterly, Sept. 28, 1966.
3' 87 Sup. Ct. 209 (1966). Budd, an alcoholic, was convicted of public intoxication in
violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 647(f) (West Supp. 1966).32 Budd v. California, 87 Sup. Ct. 209, 211 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
33 Ibid.
34 See Comment, 46 B.U.L. Rev. 409, 410-11 (1966).
85 See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 364-65, 382 (1910) (minimum penalty for a
single false entry in official records: imprisonment for 12 years and a day with chain at
ankle and wrist, hard and painful labor, loss of family status during the term of imprison-
ment, and loss of the right to vote, hold office, and travel freely forever).36 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (deprivation of citizenship as punishment for
wartime desertion from the armed forces).
37 E.g., Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683, 687 (E.D. Ark. 1965) (convict required to
perform work beyond his physical capacities).
38 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
39 See Broeder & Merson, "Robinson v. California: An Abbreviated Study," 3 Am. Crim.
L.Q. 203 (1965), for an undocumented but provocative analysis of the importance of the case.
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Intoxication as a Defense to Crime
Voluntary intoxication is no defense to a criminal charge4° except to the ex-
tent that it may negative specific intent when the intent is an essential element
of the crime.41 Involuntary intoxication, on the other hand, furnishes a defense
even when the crime requires only a general criminal intent 4 2 The paucity of
successful pleas of involuntary intoxication has led one commentator to conclude
that "involuntary intoxication is simply and completely nonexistent."43 This is
an overstatement,44 but in an overwhelming majority of the cases in which
this defense was interposed, the defendant was unsuccessful.4 5 The defense
is limited because the courts have restrictively defined the term. Unless an
individual drinks because of force, actual or threatened, exerted by another or
is innocently unaware that what he is consuming is intoxicating, his drunkenness
is deemed voluntary.40
Both Easter and Driver placed great emphasis on the "involuntary" nature
of the alcoholic's intoxication.47 In allowing chronic alcoholism as a defense
to the charge of public intoxication, they expanded the traditional defense of
40 See, e.g., Hopt v. People, 104 U.S. 631, 633 (1881); Saldiveri v. State, 217 Md. 412, 424,
143 A.2d 70, 77 (1958).
41 E.g., Heideman v. United States, 259 F.2d 943, 946-47 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 959 (1959); Roberts v. People, 19 Mich. 400, 417 (1870). But cf. State v. Shipman,
354 Mo. 265, 189 S.W.2d 273, 274 (1945); State v. Stacy, 104 Vt. 379, 407, 160 AUt. 257
(1932).
An enlightening case on specific intent requirements is Simpson v. State, 81 Fla. 292, 87
So. 920 (1921), where the accused was acquitted of a charge of breaking and entering a
dwelling house with intent to commit rape. The prosecution proved breaking and attempting
to enter, but not the specific intent of rape.
Voluntary intoxication may be a factor in reducing a first degree murder charge to second
degree or manslaughter. E.g., State v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 Pac. 1071 (1915).
42 E.g., Bartholomew v. People, 104 Ill. 601 (1882); Choate v. State, 19 Okla. Crim. 169,
197 Pac. 1060 (1921); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40-1-9 (1963); Ga. Code Ann. § 26-403
(1953); Perkins, Criminal Law 787 (1957); Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part 564-
68 (2d ed. 1961); Hall, "Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility," 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1045,
1054-56 (1944); Paulsen, "Intoxication as a Defense to Crime," 1961 U. Ill. L.F. 1, 18.
43 Hall, supra note 42, at 1056.
44 There are a few cases where the defense of involuntary intoxication was successfully
interposed. Perkins v. United States, 228 Fed. 408, 420 (4th Cir. 1915) (accidental overdose
of medicine); State v. Brown, 38 Kan. 390, 396-97, 16 Pac. 259, 262 (1888) (innocent
mistake of fact as to alcoholic nature of liquid consumed); People v. Koch, 250 App. Div.
623, 294 N.Y. Supp. 987 (2d Dep't 1937) (accidental overdose of luminol prescribed by
physician); State v. Alie, 82 W. Va. 601, 608, 96 S.E. 1011, 1014 (1918) (defendant drugged[
by his eventual victim).
45 See note 42 supra. See also Burrows v. State, 38 Ariz. 99, 297 Pac. 1029 (1931);
Borland v. State, 158 Ark. 37, 249 S.W. 591 (1923); McCook v. State, 91 Ga. 740, 17 S.E.
1019 (1893); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 524, 115 S.E. 673 (1923).
In Burrows the court upheld a jury finding of voluntary intoxication on the following
extreme facts. Defendant, a student, 18 or 19 years old, requested a ride to Phoenix at a gas
station. The driver became drunk and urged defendant to drink with him. Defendant, who
had never had alcoholic beverages, refused. The driver threatened to put him out of the car.
Afraid of being left alone in the desert without money, defendant drank and became
intoxicated. While intoxicated, he shot and killed the driver. The murder conviction was
reversed on other grounds, and a new trial ordered.
46 The test applied in Burrows v. State, supra note 45, at 116, 297 Pac. at 1035, "the
influence exercised on the mind of a defendant must be such as to amount to duress or
fraud," is typical. Model Penal Code, §§ 2.08(4)-(5) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) is in
accord with the decided cases.
47 Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Driver v. Hinnant,
356 F.2d 761, 763-64 (4th Cir. 1966). See also Sweeney v. United States, 353 F.2d 10 (7th
Cir. 1965).
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involuntary intoxication. But both courts indicated that chronic alcoholism will
be a defense only to those acts which are symptomatic of the disease.48 Driver
expressly stated that in all other cases the chronic alcoholic would be treated
as a normal person.49 Thus, in crimes not directly related to alcoholism in such
a way that the acts punished are symptomatic of the disease, the law continues
to require the existence of outside influences amounting to fraud or duress;
otherwise intoxication is voluntary and no defense.
The Chronic Alcoholic and Non-alcohol Offenses
Medical authorities are in complete agreement that chronic alcoholism is a
disease,50 manifested by the "inability of the alcoholic consistently to control
either the start of drinking or its termination once started." 5' 1 Loss of control
over consumption has been described as the characteristic symptom of the
disease, the essence of which is "helpless dependence or addiction.1 52 The
Easter court recognized that the alcoholic "has lost the power of self-control
in the use of intoxicating beverages,"8 3 and Driver states clearly that "the
chronic alcoholic has not drunk voluntarily .... "54 In the future courts must meet
the argument that the recognized involuntary intoxication of the chronic alco-
holic should be included within the legal definition of "involuntary," alongside
fraud, duress, or innocent mistake, as a complete defense to crime whether an
alcohol offense or not.
There is general agreement that a "crime" is composed of two essential ele-
ments, an act (actus reus) and an intention (mens rea) 55 which must be simul-
taneously present.56 There is some disagreement among scholars as to what
constitutes an act, 57 but the necessity that the physical occurrence be occasioned
by an exertion of the will is commonly accepted.58 Spasms (involuntary muscular
contractions) are not "acts" in this sense of the word. 59 Thus, it can be argued
48 In Driver v. Hinnant, supra note 47, at 764, the court clearly indicated that it did not
intend to extend this defense to crimes which were not "symptomatic of the disease." See
also Easter v. District of Columbia, supra note 47, at 61 (Danaher, J., concurring) where the
same idea is expressed.
49 Driver v. Hinnant, supra note 47, at 764.
50 See note 5 supra.
51 Keller, supra note 5, at 127.
52 Id. at 128.
53 Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
54 Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 764 (4th Cir. 1966).
55 The leading American case on this point, Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183, 193
(1879), requires "overt acts done by responsible moral agents."
56 Generally the concurrence of mens rea and actus reus in a causal relation is required for
conviction. See Brown v. State, 28 Ark. 126 (1873) ; State v. Johnson, 77 Idaho 1, 287 P.2d
425 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1007 (1956); Meadowcroft v. People, 163 I1. 56, 45 N.E.
303 (1896); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 100 Ky. 239, 38 S.W. 422 (1896); Commonwealth
v. Mixer, 207 Mass. 141, 93 N.E. 249 (1910); Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165
(1884).
57 Holmes defined acts as mere physical activity-e.g., the famous "crooking the finger."
Holmes, Common Law 54 (1881). Salmond on the other hand felt that the term act must
include its origins, circumstances, and consequences. Salmond, Jurisprudence 401 (11th ed.
1951).
58 Holmes, Common Law 54 (1881); 4 Pound, Jurisprudence 410 (1959); Salmond, supra
note 57, at 399.
59 See Stokes v. Carlson, 362 Mo. 93, 240 S.W.2d 132 (1951) for a discussion of "act."
The court there held that there cannot be an act without volition; thus the convulsive
movements of an epileptic or the movements of the body during sleep are not "acts" which
can impose liability on the actor.
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that certain behavior by a chronic alcoholic when intoxicated may fail to
satisfy the first of the two essential elements of a crime, the actus reus, and,
since even the physical aspect of criminality is lacking, punishment in such
instances would be unreasonable.60
The mental element of criminality, mens rea, requires both knowledge and
understanding of the "nature and quality of the relevant conduct," 61 and of the
fact that a criminal result will necessarily follow from that conduct. Drunkenness,
voluntary or involuntary, is a defense to those crimes requiring specific intent.6 2
In regard to those crimes which require only general intent, the rationale of
Easter and Driver is of potential significance in extending the defense of chronic
alcoholism. General intent requires that the actor know what he is doing and
understand the criminal consequences likely to result from his acts.e6 The re-
quirement is common to all crimes except where absolute liability is imposed by
statute.64 If knowledge or volition or both are not present, there is no crime.65
When a person attains a certain degree of intoxication, he cannot form the
necessary knowledge and volition and should not be convicted of any crime un-
less the intoxication is voluntary, in which case the drinker assumes responsi-
bility for the consequences of his voluntary intoxication. The chronic alcoholic
differs in this regard from the "social drinker" who occasionally voluntarily im-
bibes excessively, since the alcoholic's intoxication is involuntary at the outset.
To say that one is not responsible for his drinking and yet assumes responsibil-
ity for his acts when drunk defies logic. Thus, a sound penal theory should pro-
vide for the situation where the offender is addicted: "it is unrealistic to say that
on the occasion in question the getting drunk was his voluntary act, in the sense
that it was something he could have avoided." 66
If, because of involuntary intoxication, the chronic alcoholic is either in-
capable of "acting"16 7 or of "intending,"0 8 he has committed no crime and
cannot be held criminally liable. This would end the argument were it not for
the further constitutional issue based on the Robinson v. California decision that,
when there is no crime, any punishment is cruel and unusual and violates the
eighth and fourteenth amendments.69 This argument in no way alters the alco-
holic's basic contention of innocence; it does add significantly to the force of
his contention.
The decision to excuse chronic alcoholics from criminal liability requires a
further decision as to when such a rule should apply. An alcoholic is not always
intoxicated, and even when he is intoxicated, his mind is not always so overcome
by drink that his knowledge and volition are impaired. Some standards must be
60 Even a police regulation requires the performance of an act. Mens rea, however, is not
required. People v. Hoy, 3 Mich. App. 666, 143 N.W.2d 577 (1966). But see Easter v.
District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1966), citing Morissette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246 (1952).61 Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 107 (2d ed. 1960).
62 See text accompanying note 41 supra.
13 See, e.g., Smith v. State, 71 Fla. 639, 71 So. 915 (1916).
64 See United States v. Balint, 258 US. 250 (1922); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota,
218 U.S. 57 (1910), where the constitutionality of criminal strict liability statutes is upheld.
65 "Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea." 3 Coke, Institutes 107 (5th ed. 1671).
66 Williams, supra note 42, at 567.
67 See text accompanying notes 56-58 supra.
68 See text accompanying notes 62-64 supra.
69 See text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.
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developed which will indicate how "drunk" the alcoholic must be in order to
avail himself of the defense. At this point the alcoholism problem necessarily
intermingles with the insanity problem. 70 Some authorities indicate that the
mental state which will excuse will be the same whether brought on by invol-
untary intoxication or by insanity and that the same test should be used.71 The
abstract logic of this approach is not open to criticism, but, as a practical matter,
the myriad variations of insanity rules from jurisdiction to jurisdiction72 cast
serious doubt on the wisdom of further extending and thereby perpetuating
such an unsatisfactory system.73 Perhaps a new approach to the mental-state
requirements by courts deciding alcoholism cases will lead to an eventual reform
in the area of insanity as well.
Practical Obstacles to Extending the Alcoholism Defense
If the law is to excuse the chronic alcoholic from criminal liability, courts
and legislatures will be faced with a number of practical problems. At the trial
level, the immediate problem will be the identification of a chronic alcoholic.
Some courts have expressed the fear that there will be many "pretenders" to
the status of alcoholism who are not, in fact, suffering from the disease.7 4 This
objection alone would appear insufficient to prevent the genuine alcoholic from
obtaining justice. No one would claim that insanity is easy to identify, yet our
sense of justice requires that an insane person be excused from criminal liability
under certain circumstances. There seems to be no more difficulty in identifying
alcoholism than in identifying insanity, and the demands of justice are equally
strong. The same court procedure used in insanity cases, expert testimony, is
appropriate for alcoholism cases as well. In many cases prior arrests and con-
victions fQr alcohol offenses may make the proof of alcoholism easier.75 As one
70 Insanity caused by drinking is treated by the criminal law just as any other type of
insanity, but abnormal and insatiable craving for alcohol, which is characteristic of chronic
alcoholism, is not included. Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424 (1860) ; State v. Potts, 100 N.C. 457,
6 S.E. 657 (1888); Flanigan v. People, 86 N.Y. 554 (1881).
71 "[llntoxication must be sufficient to affect the reason of a defendant to the extent that
he does not understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his act." Burrows v.
State, 38 Ariz. 99, 115, 297 Pac. 1029, 1035 (1931); compare McNaughtens Case, 8 C. & F.
200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). A comparison of the sections of the Model Penal Code (Pro-
posed Official Draft, 1962) on intoxication and insanity illustrates a similar intent:
§ 2.08(4) Intoxication which (a) is not self-induced or (b) is pathological is an
affirmative defense if by reason of such intoxication the actor at the time of his
conduct lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate its criminality [wrongfulness]
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
§ 4.01(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law.
72 Compare the well known "right-wrong" test of McNaughten's Case, supra note 71,
which is followed in many American jurisdictions (e.g., State v. Trantino, 44 N.J. 358,
209 A.2d 117 (1965)) with the "irresistible impulse" test (as it appears in Braham v. State,
143 Ala. 28, 38 So. 919 (1905); People v. Lowhone, 292 Ill. 32, 126 N.E. 620 (1920);
Terry v. Commonwealth, 371 S.W.2d 862 (Ky. 1963); State v. Noble, 142 Mont. 335, 384
P.2d 505 (1963); Commonwealth v. Cavalier, 284 Pa. 311, 131 Atl. 229 (1925)) and with
the more modern rule of Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), where
the test is whether the criminal act is the product of mental disease or defect.
73 See Goldstein & Katz, "Abolish the 'Insanity Defense'-Why Not?" 72 Yale L.J. 853
(1963).
74 See Choice v. State, supra note 70; Flanigan v. People, supra note 70.
75 See Sweeney v. United States, 353 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1965), where expert testimony
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medical authority points out: "The lack of physical or biochemical instruments
or tests by which the diagnosis can be verified does not prevent a diagnostician
from establishing it [alcoholism] by adequate anamnesis.""7 6
Assuming that identification of the chronic alcoholic is possible, and that the
genuinely ill can be distinguished from the imposters, what is to be done with
the accused if a court decides that he is an alcoholic and was intoxicated
at the time the "crime" was committed and therefore cannot be subjected to
criminal liability? He cannot simply be released and forgotten. This would be
an abdication of the law's responsibility for the preservation of order in society
and would be of no benefit to the individual concerned."7 Many states have
provisions for medical treatment of alcoholics,78 and a few jurisdictions have
provided by statute for enforced civil commitment.79 This solution is beneficial
to the individual who may be "cured,"80 and also promotes stability in the
community by removing a threat to the peace.8 ' Further, such enforced civil
commitment may serve as a deterrent to those who would seek to "beat the
rap" by feigning chronic alcoholism, although there are probably those who
would prefer the relative comfort of a hospital to confinement in a penitentiary.
8 2
Such a program necessarily involves a great increase in government expendi-
tures.8 3 Present treatment facilities would require thorough expansion to meet
increased demands on the system.8 4 Individual states embarking on this program
will probably not have to face the financial burdens alone; the federal govern-
ment is presently planning expenditures in this area on a cooperative basis with
state and local governments.8 8 The benefits of proper treatment and rehabilita-
tion may be well worth the additional expense involved, if the alcoholic can
be made a productive member of society.
was apparently used. Easter and Driver, on the other hand, relied heavily on long histories
of alcohol offenses as proof of illness.
76 Keller, "Definition of Alcoholism," 21 Quart. J. Stud. Alcoholism 125, 128 (1960).
"Amamnesis" is the collection of information concerning a medical or psychiatric patient
and his background for use in analyzing his condition.
77 See Moore, "Legal Responsibility and -Chronic Alcoholism," 122 Am. J. Psych. 748,
754 (1966), where the author says that complete excuse of the alcoholic is unreasonable
"particularly as we consider the immature expectations of many alcoholics."
78 E.g., Ala. Code tit. 55, §§ 373(11)-373(13f) (1960); NJ. Stat. Ann. §§ 26:2B-1 to
2B-5 (1964); Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 427-427.11 (West Supp. 1966).
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such a procedure for drug addicts. Cal. Welfare & Inst'ns Code §§ 5625-5635 (West 1966).
80 A dramatic example of the possibility of cures is found in the story of Judge Ray
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81 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664-65 (1962) indicated that such a process would
be constitutional.
82 Civil commitment may result in longer confinement than the penalty for criminal
conviction. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-155i (Supp. 1965) provides for discharge by the
hospital superintendent "when in his medical judgment such discharge is indicated."
83 Monroe County, New York spends $650 per day for confinement in the penetentiary.
The cost increases to $45 per day when hospitalization is required.
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CONCLUSION
Chronic alcoholism, a major health problem in the United States, has until
recently been treated by the law as a penal problem. The decision in Easter v.
District of ColumbiaO6-that punishment of the chronic alcoholic for the
offense of public intoxication is "cruel and unusual"-together with a similar
decision in Driver v. Hinnant,8 7 indicates that a trend is developing toward a
more constructive and humane solution-medical care in hospitals in lieu of
incarceration for penal purposes in the penitentiary. These decisions have ex-
tended the Supreme Court's prohibition of the punishment of an involuntary
status to include symptoms of the status as well.88 Courts in the future must face
the problem of whether to further extend this theory to include the products as
well as the symptoms of the status and excuse chronic 'alcoholics from liability
for acts committed when sufficiently overcome by drink to lack the requisite
mens rea element of criminality. Such a result could be achieved by expanding
the traditional concept of involuntary intoxication, presently limited to fraud,
duress, and mistake, to include chronic alcoholism.
Serious consideration should be given to this extension. A workable procedure
in lieu of punishment has been suggested by an eminent medical authority:
If intoxication is a result of the illness of alcoholism in a particular case,
the medical rights of the person must be considered and he should have his
medical condition brought before the court as a possible mitigating factor.
The court should then act to bring the alcoholic offender to enforced treat-
ment rather than punishing him. Failure to profit from treatment would
then result in some degree of quarantine for the benefit of society.8 9
John A. Lowe*
86 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
87 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966). See also Sweeney v. United States, 353 F.2d 10 (7th
Cir. 1965).
88 See Robinson v. California, 370 US. 660 (1962).
89 Moore, supra note 77, at 755.
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